Judge Feldman Upholds States’ Rights, Prizes Democratic Process In Marriage - And Response

The argument for marriage comprises odd elements often claimed by those making revolution against it.

 

— Marriage favors diversity, because man and woman are diverse, whereas gay theory rejects complementarity for a dull sameness of partner.

 

— The marriage side favors history — marriage is part of culture worldwide from the beginning of recorded time (Adam and Eve, for starters), whereas LGBT notions are excitably novel.

 

— Marriage is democratic and popular, whereas gay lobbies are screaming from courthouse steps demanding the black robes in Washington impose a single — and new — definition.

 

— Marriage has a rational basis, though self-styled homosexuals persuade judges that it is irrational and hateful — not to be tolerated another decade.

 

U.S. District Court Judge Martin Feldman’s opinion in Louisiana for marriage is a primer in the conflict for marriage. In a case brought by angry gays, Judge Feldman backs in a summary judgment the defending state in its claim that marriage law describing it as a union of one man and one woman is reasonable, good for society and good for its participants. In quoting the decision, I omit citations.

 

Marriage is real, gay theory is feeling. “This national same-sex marriage struggle animates a clash between convictions regarding the value of state decisions reached by way of the democratic process as contrasted with personal, genuine, and sincere lifestyle choices recognition. The defendants maintain that marriage is a legitimate concern of state law and policy. That it may be rightly regulated because of what for centuries has been understood to be its role. Not so say plaintiffs, who vigorously submit if two people wish to enter into a bond of commitment and care and have that bond recognized by law as a marriage, they should be free to do so, and their choice should be recognized by law as a marriage; never mind the historic authority of the state or the democratic process.”

 

Judge Feldman accounts for the human family, into the bosom of which children are reared, referring to Louisiana’s “legitimate interest in linking children with intact families formed by their biological parents.”

 

Judge Feldman relies on the high court’s decision in 2013 to overturn the Defense of Marriage Act provisions that let the federal government pinch states into a its definition of marriage. That act held marriage as it should be, between one man and one woman. But that provision was thrown out because New York had decreed that two men may marry, and since marriage has always been a state prerogative, the justices ruled DOMA an unconstitutional infringement on states’ lawful authority in a federated system of multi-level governments.

 

The Windsor opinion is one that “does little more than give both sides in this case something to hope for,” Judge Feldman says. “Observing ‘DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage,’ the Court inferred that Congress had acted with a discriminatory purpose” (italics mine). Judge Feldman worries that the Windsor case, to his court’s “unease *** merely offers bits and pieces of hope to both sides.” Though the pro-marriage dissenters in Windsor scoffed at the seven pages of states’ rights talk in the ruling, Judge Feldman views this material as important, quoting it extensively and explaining states’ rights, as they are commonly called.

 

Liberal Justice Kennedy is quoted as instructing his readers that “[t]he significance of state responsibilities for the definition and regulation of marriage dates to the Nation’s beginning; for ‘when the Constitution was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.’ *** Marriage laws vary in some respects from State to State.’ In his dissent in Windsor, Judge Roberts says the ruling leaves unchanged ‘the concerns for state diversity and sovereignty.’”

 

The judiciary must have an “emphatic trust in deference for free and open debate in a democracy,” Judge Feldman declares “It seems to me that the sweeping judicial action undertaken today reflects a basic lack of faith and confidence in the democratic process.”

 

Some states have gone for gay marriage, have “chosen differently,” but that doesn’t “mandate that Louisiana has overstepped its sovereign authority,” he explains.

 

Gay theory is a novelty. It should be viewed warily by courts and states, he warns. He says the language in Windsor is “an amorphous but alluring ‘evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.’” Judge Feldman rejects a higher standard of review sought by gay petitioners and intends to be “more circumspect. In light of still-binding precedent, this Court declines to fashion a new suspect class. To do so would distort precedent and demean the democratic process.”
He warns against judges’ caught up in the excitement of gay political gains and theory of yielding to the “temptation to read personal preference into the Constitution [which] is understandably great .... But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic.”

 

Gays and the majority in Windsor say a defense of marriage is a hatred; not so, Judge Feldman says. “The Court also hesitates with the notion that this state's choice could only be inspired by hate and intolerance. Louisiana unquestionably respected ‘a statewide deliberative process that allowed its citizens to discuss and weigh arguments for and against same-sex marriage.’ *** All sides for and against grappled with this solemn issue. The Court declines to assign an illicit motive on the basis of this record, as have also two federal appellate judges as well.”

 

Gays are unable to establish they are being deprived of substantive due process because they do not prove a fundamental right in their exclusion from marriage. “To establish a substantive due process violation, the aggrieved person must describe the infringed right with particularity and must establish it as ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.’ *** No authority dictates, and plaintiffs do not contend, that same-sex marriage is anchored to history or tradition. The concept of same-sex marriage is ‘a new perspective, a new insight,’ nonexistent and even inconceivable until very recently. *** Many states have democratically chosen to recognize same-sex marriage. But until recent years, it had no place at all in this nation's history and tradition. Public attitude might be becoming more diverse, but any right to same-sex marriage is not yet so entrenched as to be fundamental. *** There is simply no fundamental right, historically or traditionally, to same-sex marriage.”

 

Judge Feldman’s review of the gay conflict is helpful because he describes a system of ordered liberty and decentralized political authority that recognizes at least the vestiges of the interests of the American people in one of their principal cultural, religious and economic institutions.

 

“The depth of passion inherent in the issues before this Court defies definition. That federal courts thus far have joined in the hopeful chorus that the tide is turning seems ardent and is an arguably popular, indeed, poignant, outcome (whether or not credibly constitutionally driven). Perhaps, in the wake of today’s blurry notion of evolving understanding, the result is ordained. Perhaps in a new established point of view, marriage will be reduced to contract law, and, by contract, anyone will be able to claim marriage. Perhaps that is the next frontier, the next phase of some ‘evolving understanding of equality,’ where what is marriage will be explored.

 

“And as plaintiffs vigorously remind, there have been embattled times when the federal judiciary properly inserted itself to correct a wrong in our society. But that is an incomplete answer to today's social issue. When a federal court is obliged to confront a constitutional struggle over what is marriage, a singularly pivotal issue, the consequence of outcomes, intended or otherwise, seems an equally compelling part of the equation. It seems unjust to ignore. And so, inconvenient questions persist.

 

“For example, must the states permit or recognize a marriage between an aunt and niece? Aunt and nephew? Brother/brother? Father and child? May minors marry? Must marriage be limited to only two people? What about a transgender spouse? Is such a union same-gender or male-female? All such unions would undeniably be equally committed to love and caring for one another, just like the plaintiffs. In the words of the Fourth Circuit: ‘Civil marriage is one of the cornerstones of our way of life. It allows individuals to Plaintiffs’ counsel was unable to answer such kinds of questions; the only hesitant response given was that such unions would result in ‘significant societal harms’ that the states could indeed regulate. But not same-gender unions. This Court is powerless to be indifferent to the unknown and possibly imprudent consequences of such a decision. A decision for which there remains the arena of democratic debate. Free and open and probing debate. Indeed, fractious debate.”

Federalism implies local economy, liberty

 

The judge goes on to describe the limits on federal power to interfere in state government:
“[I]it is not for this Court to resolve the wisdom of same-sex marriage. The nation is witness to a strong conversation about what is marriage. The central question that must first be asked, is what is the fairest forum for the answer? A new right may or may not be affirmed by the democratic process. ‘Perhaps someday same-gender marriage will become part of this country's history and tradition, but that is not a choice this court should make.’ ***

 

“Federalism is not extinct. Federalism remains a vibrant and essential component of our nation's constitutional structure. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[B]ut a State's definition of marriage is the foundation of the State's broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to the protection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.”

 

Judge Feldman offers a helpful suggestion for you in a last footnote. A vocal defense of marriage is needed in every quarter, a resistance to the homosexual theory made in every forum, a protest noisy and visible against a tide so great that every federal judges since Windsor has struck it down.
“The public contradictions and heated disputes among the community of social scientists, clergy, politicians, and thinkers about what is marriage confirms and clearly sends the message that the state has a legitimate interest, a rational basis, in addressing the meaning of marriage.”
Shall we act today to share in rational basis and demonstrate the truth behind his judgment?