In two cases involving motorists crossing roadway markings – one a double yellow centerline and another the right lane “fog line” – the Tennessee Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the officers’ seizures of the vehicles’ drivers, both of whom also were charged with DUI.
In one case out of Williamson County, Linzey Smith was traveling north on I-65 at 3 a.m. when an officer observed her twice touch and once cross the right fog line with both right tires of her vehicle.
The officer followed her for some distance, and then initiated a stop of Ms. Smith’s vehicle.
Under the facts of a Knox County case, William Davis, Jr., was observed by an officer at 2:30 a.m. crossing the double-yellow line along Keller Bend Road, a curvy two-lane road. The officer stopped Mr. Davis, who smelled strongly of alcohol and had slurred speech.
Both defendants were charged with DUI and sought to have evidence in those cases suppressed, claiming the officers’ basis for pulling them over – crossing over roadway markings – was a violation of their constitutional rights prohibiting unlawful seizure.
The Court’s ruling addresses two Tennessee statutes. The first, cited in the Smith case, makes it a violation to stray outside a lane unless it is not practicable to do so, such as avoiding a hazard in the road, or being blown out of the lane by a high wind. The Court determined that, in this case, Ms. Smith’s driving out of her lane gave the officer reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop. Reasonable suspicion requires considering all the relevant circumstances to determine if the officer had specific facts that would support a constitutionally sufficient basis for the seizure. In this case, the Court considered such factors as the time of day, the quality of the road, and driving conditions, and determined that the threshold was met and the stop was proper.
The second statute at issue in the Davis case simply makes it an offense to cross the centerline on a highway. This second case entails probable cause, a legal standard that is related to but different from reasonable suspicion. Probable cause exists when the officer has a reasonable basis for believing that a crime has been committed. If, as in this case, an officer observes a driver actually commit a traffic infraction, the officer has probable cause to initiate a traffic stop.
In Mr. Davis’s case, the Court concluded that the General Assembly intended to establish an offense for the common driving infraction of crossing the centerline. The Court reasoned that, by this action, the General Assembly made a policy decision that all motorists who briefly cross a centerline on a highway are subject to a traffic stop for a violation of the law. Therefore, the officer in Mr. Davis’s case had proper probable cause to make the traffic stop, and any evidence gathered was constitutionally sound.
To read the unanimous opinions in State v. Linzey Danielle Smith and State v. William Whitlow Davis, Jr., both authored by Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins, go to the opinions section of
TNCourts.gov.